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LABOR LAw~LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT-UNFAIR LABOR ·PRAC-
TICE STRIKE PERMITTED DURING SIXTY-DAY "CooLING-OFF" PERIOD-Peti-
tioner clearly committed unfair labor practices and a strike in protest 
resulted. Thirty-one days prior to the strike the union had given petitioner 
notice, in accordance with section 8 (d) of the amended National Labor 
Relations Act,1 of its desire to 'modify the existing collective bargaining 
agreement. [Section 8 (d) makes it an unfair labor practice for a party 
to an existing contract to modify the contract without, inter alia, giving 
notice to the other party of the desfre to modify 60 days before the expira-
tion of the contract, and continuing in effect, without resorting fo strike 
or lockout, all terms of the existing contract for 60 days or until the 
expiration date of the contract, whichever occurs later.2 An employee 
who strikes during the 60-day period loses his status as an employee for 
the purp~ses of sections 8~ 9, and 10 of the act.3 ] ~etitioner refused to 
reinstate the strikers upon their offer to return to work." Both the NLRB5 
161 S~at. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (d). 
2 This is referred to as the no-strike clause of §8 (d). 
3 This is referred to as the loss-of-status clause of §8 (d). Sections 8, 9, and 10 of 
the amended National Labor Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §§158, 
159, 160, specify employer and union unfair labor practices, regulations for election of 
bargaining representations, and remedial powers of the Board. The effect of the loss-
of-status clause would be to withdraw from an employee the benefit of the Board's 
administrative remedies. 
4In addition to arguing that the strike violated §8 (d), petitioner maintained that 
the strike also violated the contract's no-strike clause. The union had promised "to 
refrain from engaging in any strike or work stoppage during the term of this agreement." 
Principal case at 281. The NLRB, court of appeals, and Supreme Court unanimously 
held that this clause did not prevent a strike to protest petitioner's unfair labor prac-
tices. The Supreme Court said that since the contract dealt with the economic relation-
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and the court of appeals8 held that 8 (d) does not prohibit an unfair labor 
practice strike during the 60-day period, and ordered reinstatement of the 
strikers. On certiorari to the Supreme Court, held, affirmed, three justices 
dissenting.7 Section 8 (d) applies only to strikes that seek to modify or 
terminate an existing agreement. A prohibition on unfair labor practice 
i;trikes during the 60-day period would penalize a union that complies 
with the statute. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). 
A literal interpretation of the language of section 8 (d) would prohibit 
all strikes during the 60-day "cooling-off" period. The legislative history 
of 8 (d) does not indicate conclusively what kinds of strikes Congress 
intended to prohibit, but it does suggest that the draftsmen did not intend 
to restrict seriously the existing rights of labor.8 Section 8 (d) does not 
define "strike," despite the fact that important union and employee rights 
hinge up~n the kind of strike engaged in. Strikes are classified generally 
as unfair labor practice strikes and economic strikes9 and may be protected 
or unprotected· activity.10 Employees may not be discharged for engaging 
in protected activity,11 but may be if they participate in unprotected 
ship between the parties, the no-strike clause was aimed at avoiding interruptions of 
production prompted by efforts to change the existing economic relationship. This is 
in accord with previous law. The NLRB has held that strikes in breach of no-strike 
clauses are unprotected activity, but only if there has been no antecedent unfair labor 
practice or breach of contract by the employer. Scullin Steel Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1294 
(1946), enforced as modified (8th Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 143; Joseph Dyson & Sons, Inc., 
72 N.L.R.B. 445 (1947). But see National Electric Products Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 995 
(1948), which the Board distinguished in the principal case, 103 N.L.R.B. 5II at 514 
(1953). 
5 Mastro Plastics Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 511 (1953). 
6 (2d Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 462. 
7 Justice Frankfurter wrote the dissenting opinion which was concurred in by Justices 
Harlan and Minton. 
s The Senate minority report raised the problem of the principal case. S. Rep. 
(Minority Views) ·105, Part 2, 80th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 21-22 (1947). But the majority 
report giyes no answer. S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 24 (1947). Note the following 
remarks by Senators Taft and Ball. Taft: "So it [section 8 (d)] seems to me to be no 
real limitation of the rights of labor unions." 93 CONG. REc. 3839 (1947). Ball: Section 
8 (d) "merely says to unions, 'You must have a 60-day reopening clause in your contract.'" 
93 CONG. REc. 7530 (1947). For a compilation of the legislative history by the NLRB. 
see "Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947" (1948). 
9 An unfair labor practice strike is a strike to protest an employer unfair labor 
practice; an economic strike is aimed at improvement of wages, working conditions, etc. 
10 Protected activity is any concerted activity within the terms of §7, amended' 
National Labor Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §157. Unprotected 
activity includes specific union unfair labor practices which were added in 1947, the-
amended National Labor Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (b)r 
and certain kinds of activity carved out of the protection of §7 by the courts. NLRB v~ 
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (sit-down strike); NLRB v. Sands: 
Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939) (breach of contract); Southern SS Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 
31 (1942) (strike in violation of federal statute); American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 
(1944) (illegal objective). See Petro, "Concerted Activities-Protected and Unprotected," 
l LAB. L. J. 1155 (1950) and 2 LAB. L. J. 3 (1951). 
11 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); NLRB v. Cowles 
Pub. Co., (9th Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 708. 
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activity.12 An: ·employer must reinstate unfair labor practice ·strikers even 
if he must discharge replacements hired during the strike,13 but an em-
ployee who strikes for economic gains is entitled to his job only if he has 
not been replaced during the strike.14 If section 8 (d) applies to unfair 
'labor practice strikers it deprives such strikers of their highly protected 
status and subjects them to discharge at the discretion of the employer. 
It seems doubtful that Congress would do this without an express pro-
vision to that effect, or without a more cogent reason than section 8 (d) 
suggests, namely, that collective bargaining during the "cooling-off" period 
would be made more effective by depriving employees of the right to 
strike in protest of employer unfair labor practices. The fundamental 
distinction in treatment accorded economic and unfair labor practice 
strikers is probably the principal reason why the NLRB, the court of 
appeals, and the Supreme Court could not believe Congress intended an 
unfair labor practice strike to be included in section 8 (d).15 The uncer-
tainty due to the failure to define "strike" is compounded by separate penal-
ties for the union (the no-strike clause) and for the employee (the loss-
of-status clause). The minority of the Court concluded that unless section 
8 (d) applies to all strikes, the loss-of-status clause has no significance. Since 
a strike in violation of 8 (d) is a union unfair labor practice, strikers par-
ticipating in such activity would be unprotected, and the loss-of-status claim 
is redundant in the case of economic strikes. In the absence of the loss-
of-status clause, if a strike were caused by an antecedent employer unfair 
labor practice, the NLRB could hold that the strike was protected.16 The 
loss-of-status clause would prevent such a result, however, since that clause 
deprives strikers of their status as employees. Therefore, according to the 
minority, the loss-of-status clause is effective only if it applies to unfair 
labor practice strikers. The majority answers that the "clause is justifiable 
as a clarification of the .law and as a warning to employees against engag-
ing in economic strikes during the statutory waiting period.''17 Since 
Congress did not prescribe any employee unfair labor practices, perhaps 
the loss-of-status clause was intended ·to state explicitly that employees 
striking during the "cooling-off" period would be outside the act. However, 
if one believes that section 8 (d) was not intended as a departure from the 
distinction between economic and unfair labor practice strikes, he will 
not be convinced by the minority's argument, even though there is no 
objection to it as a matter of statutory construction. 
12 See cases cited note 10 supra. 
13 NLRB v. Biles-Coleman Lumber Co., (9th Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 197, 98 F. (2d) 
18; Wheatland Electric Cooperative v. NLRB, (10th Cir. 1953) 208 F. (2d) 878. 
14 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., note 11 supra; United Biscuit Co. of 
America v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 771; West Coast Casket Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 
:820 (1951). 
15 See note 4 supra. 
16 Section 10 (c), amended National Labor Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 147, 29 U.S.C. 
(1952) §160 (c). 
17Principal case at 287. 
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The majority holds that the strikers are not subject to the penalties 
of section 8 (d) because the objective of the strike "was not to ter171,inate 
or modify the contract."18 This reasoning may be interpreted to mean 
that any strike during the "cooling-off" period for an objective other than 
terminating or modifying an agreement is not subject to section 8 (d). In 
the principal case the employer had clearly committed unfair labor prac-
tices. What if the strike were in protest of an alleged unfair labor prac-
tice, but the NLRB found that none had been committed? In such a case, 
the strike is not an unfair labor practice strike. However, the union never-
theless struck for an objective other than terminating or modifying the 
agreement. The majority reasoning supports the conclusion that such 
strike activity is not covered by section 8 (d). Such an interpretation will, 
unfortunately, permit unions to apply economic pressure for bargaining 
purposes by striking on the pretext of an unfair labor practice. It is often, 
difficult to determine whether or not an employer has committed an unfair 
labor practice, especially when the charge is refusal to bargain in good 
faith.19 It would therefore be difficult to determine whether a union 
which strikes in protest of an unfair labor practice has struck in good 
faith to protest the unfair labor practice or has struck to strengthen its 
bargaining position. One may reasonably conclude from the unqualified 
language of section 8 (d), which is literally broad enough to prohibit _all 
strikes, and the fundamental distinction between economic and unfair 
labor practice strikes, that Congress intended to prohibit all strikes except 
those protesting actual unfair labor practices. Unions and employees 
would be reluctant to strike during the 60-day period to protest an unfair 
labor practice, since they would be subject to 8 (d) unless one had in fact 
been committed. Although the Court in the principal case reached a 
result in accord with the probable intent of Congress, in seeking to justify 
its conclusion on statutory language it has, perhaps, unduly restricted the 
application of section 8 (d). 
Edward C. Hanpeter, S.Ed. 
18 Principal case at 286. 
19 See, for example, Associated Unions of America, Insurance Employees Local 65 
v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 52. 
